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NOTES
THE KENTUCKY SALARY CASE
ConstitutionalLaw -

Spurious Interpretatioiz -

Officers.

An action was brought by the Public Service Commission of
Kentucky against J. Dan Talbott, Commissioner of Finance
(represented by the Attorney General who also intervened on behalf of the Commonwealth). The original petition and the intervening petition sought a declaratory judgment respecting the
duty of the finance commissioner to pay for services of the President and certain members of the staff of the University of Kentucky, and those of the Murray State Teachers College, certain
attorneys employed by the state to collect delinquent taxes, and a
certain person employed as an expert by the Public Service Commission. The trial court held, in Talbott v. Public Service Cammission,' that the above mentioned persons were not within the
salary restriction of sec. 246, the reason being that these persons
were not "officers". On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that,
though the members of the University and college staffs were not
officers, yet they were included by implication within this section. It also held that the other defendants were not included
because they were independent contractors.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In order that the further argument may be more clear, see.

246 is here reproduced:
"246. Maximum limit on salaries of public officers. No public
officer, except the Governor, shall receive more than five thousand
dollars per annum, as compensation for official services, independent
of the compensation of legally authorized deputies and assistants,
which shall be fixed and provided for by law. The General Assembly
shall provide for the enforcement of this section by suitable penalties,
one of which shall be forfeiture of office by any person violating its
provisions."
a. Public Officers v. Public Employees
In the first place much attention was devoted to defining
the term "public officer" and difficulty was experienced in that
task. There was no law creating professorships and the duties
not being regulated by law, the conclusion was finally reached
'291 Ky. 109, 169 S. W. 2d 33 (1942).
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that this employment arose out of contract and not from the
holding of all office.
When the attorneys for the University prepared the briefs
'in the case, it was believed that their task was simply to show by
the precedents that state university presidents and professors
were not officers. Nothing more seemed required. It is true that
a somewhat obscure paragraph in the Attorney General's brief
urged that it was futile to try to distinguish between "officers"
and "employees"
and therefore the distinction was to be
abandoned and all persons who perform services for the state
were under the limitation of sec. 246. The holding that see. 246
included employees generally came as a complete surprise because it departed from the theory of the earlier cases. On very
many occasions the Court took meticulous pains to distinguish
between officers and employees. This, of course, is also the case
in all other common law jurisdictions, without any exception.
No prior practical interpretation sustained the decision.
Oin several occasions the former attorneys general had expressed the opinion that members of the University staff were
not officials and relying thereon the auditor had approved payrolls in excess of $5,000 a year for individual members.
b. Comparative Salaries of Officials and Employees
The Court indulged in a theory of political science which
historically is believed to be without foundation, that employees
should be paid less than officers. There has been a long standing English-American tradition against payment of salaries
to public officers. This tradition was wide-spread fifty years
ago, when our present Constitution was adopted. The provision for salaries of public officers, who frequently have
power and influence sufficient to affect their compensation,
was niade as a limitation upon this tradition. The theory
was that the honor of holding office, and the satisfaction
oif ambition was an adequate reward. There is a definite body
of public opinion today which agrees. Until recently the membership in the British House of Commons received no pay, and
even now the pay is small and is far below that of many employed in the civil service.
"The branch of American history [says Professor John R.
Rood in a communication to this writer] which has never known
a scandal (The Louisiana case is the exception that proves the
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rule) is the administration of the great state universities; and it
is believed that this in no small measure is due to the fact that
managing boards serve without pay; wherefore the place-hunters
and grafters leave them to be administered by persons interested
in public education. Our universities could never have escaped so
long if great compensations had been the attraction. In elections
to public office price never gets quality."
The Court declares that the Constitution makers must have
contemplated that employees would be necessary in the state's
business. They therefore must have included them when they
sought to safeguard the treasury. It is difficult not to turn this
argument the other way. If they did contemplate the need of
experts and meant to limit their salaries, why did they not say
so ? Having this situation specifically in mind, did they become
inhrticulate in that respect and leave the matter to the labored
implication of the Court and wholly undiscovered until 1942?
The express mention of state employees as, for example, in see.
249, indicates that they used the term when they had need for it.
With respect to the University of Kentucky, the opinion
of the Court overlooks a controlling fact. The Board of Trustees
functions as a part-time state board. A similar board is the
State Board of Education, which is an unpaid body charged
with the supervision of a large department but its employees
are paid. So the State Board of Health includes in its official
family eminent physicians. Thus is exemplified the principle
that part-time board members either are not paid at all or receive
only nominal compensation. In the Board's employ are civil
service workers whose salaries naturally bear no relationship to
the compensation of the members of the Board. Likewise the
Department of Welfare is an advisory Board without compensation. *Even the members of the Unemployment Compensation
Commission are paid a per diem compensation and some of its
employees receive more than members of the Board other than
the director and chairman. go the Board of Trustees of the
University is a part-time Board serving without pay, entrusted
with the general control of the University policies. Its members
have always been unpaid servants.
This was the situation in Kentucky when the Constitution
was adopted. This was the common tradition over the whole
United States. In our neighboring state, Ohio, to use one illustra-
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tion, at about the time of the adoption of our constitution, a statutory restriction limiting the amount which the Ohio State University could pay its President was removed. 2 Information is
lacidng as to the amount of the salary paid there in the nineties
but the 39th and 41st annual reports of the Board of Trustees,
for 1909 and 1911, show that $6,000 was paid in the former and
$7,000 in the latter year. This was definitely higher than the
sum paid any executive officer. 3 We have also scattered information for Illinois. In 1892 the University's President received
$6,000, the same as was, in 1942, the maximum paid to heads of
state executive departments. For 1906 the University President
received $800 per month. For 1910 the President received
$10,000 per year, together with use of the president's house,
furnished with heat, light and water, and provision for the
keeping of three horses. By 1911 the salary was raised to
$12,000.4

e. The University Staff and the Independent Contractor
The opinion holds that this salary restriction does not apply to the independent contractor. At page 116 the Court said,
respecting any member of the staff: "His duties are regularly
prescribed by mandate of his superiors; and to whom he is responsible both as to the means and methods employed in his
work and as to the results obtained thereby." The Court then
concludes that the members of the staff are employees but not
officers.
At page 117 the Court says that the other defendants are
not employees. It is certainly strange to find the state paying
out sums to persons for services who are neither officers nor employees. Search as one will, this is the only declaration that has
been found that such persons are not employees whether one
classifies them in the specific case as independent contractors, or
servants, or by any other descriptive title.
The Restatement of Agency 5 speaks of the employment of
A. CAPE (THOMAS C.
UNIVERSITY, p. 165.

MENDENHALL ED.),

HISTORY OF OHIO STATE

Omo GEN. CODE (1910), secs. 2248-2250, incl.
Annual Report of Board of Trustees of Illinois for 1892, p.
250; lb. for 1906, p. 195; ib. for 1908, p. 165; lb. for 1912, p. 458. For
salaries of state officers of Ohio, see OHIo GEN. CODE (1910), secs.
2248-2250. In California also the President's salary in 1910 was
$12,000. These illustrations could be multiplied many times over in
many states. See Biennial Report, Univ. of Calif. for 1910-12, p. 375.
Sec. 1, com. d.
4See

, 198

-
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attorneys, brokers, etc., so evidently they are employees though
they are independent contractors. In sec. 220 the independent
contractor is distinguished by the character of his employment.
but he is an employee. The Restatement of Torts, secs. 40f9-429,
speaks of the employment of independent contractors, distinguishing their employment from that of servants and declaring under what circumstances an employer is liable to third persons where independent contractors are involved.
Both professors and those performing services for the Revenue Department and the Public Service Commission, being
employees, is there a difference in the nature of the control over
them? Yes, the Court says, at page 116.
But this is a strange misunderstanding of the functions of
a university. The opinion intimates that there is a special reason to relieve independent contractors from the provisions of this
section and it is intimated that the state cannot build roads and
bridges without expert advice and expert advice must be paid
for. Since the state cannot function without experts, it is necessary, therefore, to hold that sec. 246 is inapplicable to them.
Of course some sort of bridges and roads can be built without the aid of experts who draw more than $5,000 per year. In
the same way, some sort of an educational plant can be maintained without the employment of experts. The Court would
not wish to intimate that the construction of good roads and
good buildings is more significant to the welfare of the state
than the adoption of sound educational standards, principles
and policies for the training of its young men and women.
The opinion correctly shows that the compensation of such
persons as the independent contractor is by tradition and prior
decisions not limited by the Constitution.
The members of the Board of Trustees, however, would find
it embarrassing on their part to direct the teaching of Spanish,
accounting, statistics, philosophy, the sciences of chemistry,
physics, and geology, the breeding of stock, the propagation of
plant life, the chemistry of soils or any of the research carried
on by the University in many fields. The members of the UTniversity staff must not only be experts themselves but must train
others to become experts. Thus, the Board provides the state
with men and women professionally trained in agriculture,
engineering, law, business, education, and many other fields.
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Mr. Bearden advises his employer, the Public Service Commission. The staff of the University not only advise but create much
of the material on which the University's work is based. The
more experts the University has and the higher their training and
accomplishments, the greater is the service done for the young
men and women of this state. Without the staff of experts, the
Trustees would be even more helpless than would be the Public
Service Commission without its adviser. For example in the
matter of the black root rot of Burley tobacco, who is qualified
to give the investigator any advice or direction in his study of
its causes, the methods to be pursued and the results to be obtained?
It is disheartening at this late date to find that there are
still intelligent people, even lawyers and judges, who believe
that university professors are mere mechanical agencies through
which a board of trustees dictates what is to be taught and how,
or can exercise any oversight with respect to research, its subject
matter, methods, or results. The idea that a university is a magnified district school is something that dies hard in this country.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRUCTION

a. The Construction of Section 246
Respecting the matter of contemporaneous and subsequent
construction, two things would seem apparent: (1) That the
proper officers of the state have, for more than thirty years, regarded sec. 246 as not applicable to members of the staff. This
position has been fortified by the written opinions of three attorneys general. (2) The Court itself has, by implication, adopted
such a construction. In all the cases which have preceded this
one interpreting sec. 246, it has been assumed that in order to
impose that limitation the Court must find that the recipient was
an officer and not an employee. If the view that all employees are
included in see. 246 is followed, then there was no necessity to
7
hold in Alvey v. Brigham0 and City of Loidsville v. German
that the recipient was an officer rather than an employee.
b. The Constitution as Amended
go until recently sec. 246 of the Constitution read:
0286 Ky. 610, 150 S. W. 2d 935 (1941).
1286 Ky. 477, 150 S. W. 2d 931 (1940).
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"No public officer except the Governor shall receive more than
$5,000 per annum as compensation for official services."

If this opinion is sustained the Constitution now as amended
reads:
"No public officer except the Governor ... (and no employee of
the state except independent contractors) shall receive more than
$5,000 per annum for their official services (if they be officers, or for
their services other than official services, if they be employees, save
that independent contractorsare not hereby limited to that amount)."

The last sentence in sec. 246 also gives color to the whole:
"The General Assembly shall (is required to) provide for the
enforcement of this section by suitable penalties, one of which shall
be (is required to be) forfeiture of office by any person violating its
provisions."

It is clear that this requirement of the Constitution is
violated if the defendants or any of them are not to be penalized
in the very specific way which this section has laid down as an
absolute necessity. As amended by the Court this part of the
section now reads:
"The General Assembly shall (is required to) provide for the
enforcement of this section by suitable penalties, one of which shall
(is required to) be forfeiture of office by any person violating its
provisions. (But the provision for this penalty is not to be applicable to employees nor to independent contractors)."

Does the Court desire to be understood that this is not an
amendment

to the Constitution?

On

this

matter

Professor

Pound, former Dean of the Harvard Law School, a former Commissioner of the Nebraska Supreme Court and a distinguished
lawyer and jurist, under date of September 8, 1945, wrote to
the author of this paper as follows:
"I agree entirely that the decision of your Court of Appeals in
Talbott v. Public Service Commission is an outstanding example of
spurious interpretation. If it were held that public officers included
employees not public officers it would still be going pretty far, but
when the distinctions are added certainly there is nothing short of
making of a new constitutional prohibition out of whole cloth."

c:

Earlier Kentucky Decisions on Constitutional Interpretation

8
In Board of Education v. City of Louisville the Court said:

"When those restrictions (in the Constitution) are not specified
but are contained in general principles the courts have found them
flexible enough not 'to impair the efficiency of the legislature to
meet responsibility occasioned by changing conditions of society' and
8288 Ky. 656, at 671, 157 S. W. 2d 337, at 345 (1941)
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to 'bring them into accord with what the courts believe to be the
public interest.'"
The Court knows of its own knowledge that the interpretation heretofore placed upon this section brings to its own state
university a handicap which the future generations will continually feel. This Court has often expressed its interest and
concern for its educational system and that concern should not
be forgotten in this connection.
In City of Louisville v. German,9 the Court said:
"In construing provisions of a Constitution courts generally have
adopted a rule of construction sufficiently liberal to carry out its
spirit and purpose rather than a strict technical construction that
would operate to render it impotent and defeat the purpose of its
adoption. However, there is no justification for the indulgence of
liberality to the extent that it would nullify and defeat plain mandatory constitutional provisions."
If words can be pinned down to any degree of precision, it
is evident that there is no plain mandatory language in the
Constitution requiring the insertion of the word "employees."
On the same page the Court further recognized that due to
changed economic conditions sec. 246 of the Constitution
If that be the case,
"tends to impede progress and efficiency."
should the Court create a limitation which is not clearly there
and which has the effect of impeding progress and efficiency?
The Court further said:
"The power to amend or repeal the Constitution is not in the
Court but is reposed in the people who adopted it. It is presumed
that in framing the Constitution great care was exercised in the
language used to convey its meaning and as little as possible left to
implication."
Judge Rees, in dissenting, pointed out as an additional
reason tor holding that professors were not included, the fact
that sec. 246 is by nature a legislative measure though found in
the Constitution, where only fundamental principles should be expressed. A legislative measure should be limited to its immediate terms inasmuch as the subject matter of legislation is subject
to frequent need for change-not so general principles. "In
construing a constitutional provision courts are limited to the
language used and are controlled by what the framers of the instrument said not by what they might have meant to say." It
has been shown above not only that the makers did not say "em-286 Ky. 477, at 483, 150 S. W. 2d 931, at 935 (1940).
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ployees" but by the declaration, the penalty which they imposed
they did not intend to say "employees."
d.

The U. S. Supreme Court's Attitude Towards Constitutional Interpretation

itcannot be out of place here to call attention to the statesmanship of such great judges as Chief Justice John Marshall.
Repeatedly refusing to accept a literal construction of the federal
constitution but rather by interpreting it in a liberal spirit as a
document intended to stand throughout the generations, he put
the early Republic on a firm foundation. No one has since regretted this spirit of liberalism. Thus, by Marbury v. Madison,
the doctrine of judicial review was set up, to expand but not to
contract the powers of government. In the Slaughter House
cases the Court said at one point: "The argument we admit, is
not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction
of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far reaching and pervading .. .the
argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of
language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit
of doubt."
Do courts consider "consequences" of their interpretation?
The following is from the pen of Mr. Justice Strong in the
Legal Tender Cases:
"It would be difficult to overestimate the consequences which
must follow our decision. They will affect the entire business of the
country, and take hold of the possible continued existence of the
government. If it be held by this Court that Congress has no Constitutional power under any circumstances, or in any emergency, to
make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts ...
the Government is without those means which all must admit may
in certain contingencies become indispensable ..."

In Sharpless v. Mayor,"° the court said in part: "We are
urged to hold . . .that a law though not prohibited is void if it
violates the spirit of our institutions .-.. . But we cannot do
this. It would be assuming a right to change the constitution to
supply what we may conceive to be its defects."
So in the smaller field occupied by the University of Kentucky the consequences of this decision are equally disastrous to
1021 Pa. 147 (1853).
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it and to the interests of higher education within the Commonwealth. The Court recognized "consequences" in excluding socalled "independent contractors" from the ban. Greater
familiarity with the nature and operation of a modern university
should have led to the same result as to staff members. It is pref.
erable, however, to say that the word "officers" is a restrictive
word and cannot apply to employees.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not hesitated
to overrule prior decisions when later and maturer reflection
dictated such a course. Thus Loch zer v. New York and Adair
v. The United States, holding that the hours of work cannot be
limited by statute nor can employees be protected from arbitrary
discharge, have been overruled. Swift v. Tyson, holding in substance that the Federal Courts need not follow state common law
decisions, was expressly overruled by Tompkins v. The Erie Railroad Coiapaniy. These later cases considered that the policy of
the earlier decisions was unwholesome and should be corrected.
So in Hooze Building and Loaz Association v. Blaisdell," the
Supreme Court overruled in effect its earlier holding and sustained Minnesota's moratorium statute. The taxing by the federal government of state salaries, represents another change of
front, as also the fact that it is now constitutional for the
National Congress to control state primary elections. The attitude of the Supreme Court toward stare decisis in constitutional
cases was expressed recently (1944) by Mr. Justice Stanley Reed
as follows:
"In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon
amendment and not upon legislative action, this court throughout its
history has fully exercised its power to re-examine the bases of constitutional decisions."'
Thus stare decisis has less significance in constitutional cases
than in others.
e.

The Immediate Effect upon the University

The problem as it affects the University staff has four
aspects involving the cases of: (a) MNen who have left the University because of other offers exceeding the Kentucky salary
limit. (b) Members who had neither reached this salary limit
nor had been offered an amount elsewhere beyond it but left be"1290 U. S. 398 (1933).
"Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944).
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cause of the better future salary prospects. (c) Men who refused
to come to the University for $5,000. (d) Men who refused to
accept employment not because of the immediate salary offered,
but because for the future the position was unattractive. It is of
course much more difficult to pin down (c) and (d) to names
and terms because of other factors that might be present. It is
possible, however, to give names and figures respecting those in
class (a),
Of 67 staff members who resigned since approximately the
date of that case, the new salaries of 16 were above $5,000 and
ranged from $5,000 to $15,000. Thirteen additional ones are
placed in class (b) who left primarily because it was assumed
they could never be paid in Kentucky more than $5,000. In most
of the other cases the salary received elsewhere is not definitely
known. This does not include any who resigned to join the
armed forces. With the loss of 67 of the younger members in a
period of three years, it does not require much imagination to see
what will happen to the University as things now stand, over a
period of ten or more years.
The above paragraph was no more than written when a
young assistant professor told this writer that he had just resigned to accept a position out of the state at a salary larger by
$2,000.
To sun up. (a) The argument that "employees" should
receive less or not more than "officers" conflicts with a long
tradition that the holding of office is largely its own reward.
Further in the case of the University, the Board of Trustees, the
employer, receives no salary at all. (b) The distinction between
independent coitractors and University staff members cannot be
made out. The president, deans, and heads of departments are
more independent as to objectives and methods than are the em.
ployees exempted by the Court, and are held for results only and
have no other supervision by superiors. (c) This holding is a
glaring departure from a long line of cases where the court
drew a close distinction between officers and employees. (d)
The last sentence of see. 246 requiring the imposition of the
penalty (for violation of it) cannot be applicable and accordingly
the decision requires a violation of this section. (e) The effect is
admittedly disastrous. The Supreme Court of the United
States had held that the consequence is an important considera-
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tion in constitutional interpretation. (f) But most important of
all, the opinion creates a court made amendment to the constitution by including "employees" within the ban. This is done in
spite of the Court's own argument that the makers realized that
the state would necessarily require the employment of experts in
the conduct of its affairs and failed to mention them in the Constitution. It is bad enough that the state cannot compensate the
members of its highest tribunal in accord with the standards of
sister states. Certainly Kentucky ought not deliberately to seek
out opportunities for crippling herself and of denying to her
children the expert educational training available in other states.
ALVIN B. EvANs

